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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980 and 1981 Supreme Court terms brought the usual quota of
equal protection cases involving newly established suspect categories-
alienage, illegitimacy, and gender-as well as fundamental rights. Both
types of cases call for some form of heightened judicial scrutiny. While the
justices seem to agree on the articulation of the standards of review, they
have been unable to agree on the application of these standards where
something other than strict scrutiny is involved.
It is the thesis of this Article that meaningful standards which are only
"means oriented" cannot be applied consistently. The decisions being
made in the equal protection area are at the very limits of the judicial
power, if not beyond it. But the Court majority refuses to acknowledge that
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.
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it is making any value judgments at all, let alone making them based on
legislative, not adjudicative, facts.
The past two terms suggest that modern equal protection jurispru-
dence has entered a third critical phase. The first phase ended in 1973
when it became clear that the categories triggering strict scrutiny, suspect
classes and fundamental rights, had closed. The second phase began in
1976 with agreement that some form of intermediate scrutiny, other than
the always fatal strict scrutiny, was appropriate for some of the suspect cate-
gories or fundamental rights. The third phase came to the fore in the 1980
and 1981 terms, with attempts, so far unsuccessful, to apply an intermediate
level of scrutiny in ways that avoided making legislative judgments. But
such judgments cannot be avoided, even in a test that purports to be purely
means related.
Modern scholarship in equal protection began with a far-sighted 1949
article by Tussman and tenBroek.' They described the problems of under-
inclusive and overinclusive legislation and noted that judicial review under
the equal protection clause is problematic, if not troublesome, because of
the difference between a legislature doing theoretically all that it might do
in a legal context and doing practically all that it could do in a political
context. Twenty years later, a student piece described a developing two-
tiered approach utilized by the Warren court and traced that all-or-nothing
test in the context of the relative effectiveness of legislative and judicial rem-
edies.2 Three years later, Professor Gerald Gunther posited a new model
derived from his perception of some Supreme Court decisions.' He urged
an intermediate test, between strict scrutiny and minimum rationality,
under which the Court would look at the legislative choice of means only
with reference to the avowed legislative purpose. He called this test mini-
mum rationality with bite. He believed that scrutiny of only the means
used to achieve the avowed ends would provide a safeguard for the political
process by keeping the judiciary out of an investigation of legislative ends.
The literature expressing concern with the political structure began to
examine the potential social impact of equal protection litigation.4 A new
1. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949).
2. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
3. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
4. See Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IoWA L. REV. 1059
(1974); Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791
(1976); Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Nowak, Realigning the Stan-
dards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Pennissive
Classifcations, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness"." Notes on
Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977); Shaman, The Rule of
Reasonableness in Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Re-
view and the Establishment of a Viable Theogy of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS
[Vol. 48
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notion of egalitarianism was posited, and different types of inequality were
examined.5 Problems of political equality and equality of opportunity
presented little analytic difficulty, but those of economic equality and
equality of condition-when requiring more than minimum rationality-
again raised questions regarding the institutional competency of courts.6
Thus, the parameters of equal protection today remain much as Tussman
and tenBroek perceived them. The Court deals with legislative classifica-
tions, which are most often the result of political compromise. The search
for standards of review is complicated by the pervasive question of the sub-
stantive meaning of equal protection as it is affected by changing social
norms and continuing questions about the legitimacy of the judicial role.
Inevitably, scholarly attention has been refocusing on the primary responsi-
bility of the legislative branch in such matters.
7
II. THE RISE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The growth of litigation under the equal protection clause should not
have been surprising. That growth was to be expected as government pro-
grams became more important in the lives of more people. Legislative fine
tuning of remedial categories was frequently a matter of political compro-
mise. Since no rights of arguably absolute dimensions (like free speech)
were involved, any due process approach to the validity of legislation might
involve balancing. Balancing smacks of judicial legislation, of substitution
of political judgment by the courts, even in cases where substantive rights
are involved. As a device that challenges the fairness of legislative catego-
ries and strikes down non-individualized processes under which government
deals with people in areas important to them, it now seems an inevitable
tool for a "liberal" or activist court operating in the milieu of the 1960's to
CONST. L.Q. 153 (1975); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stan-
dards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 945 (1975).
5. The seminal piece in this area is Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-
Forward: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969). The most recent of the "activist" arguments is found in Karst, The Supreme
Court 1976 Term-Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
6. See Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classifations in Social Legisla-
tion: Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1 (1975); Grey, Do We Have an Unwrit-
ten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theogy of Equal Protection,
57 N. CAR. L. REV. 1 (1978); Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Tenn-Forward"
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
7. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). See Linde, supra note 6; Sager, supra note 6; cf. G. CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
1983]
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develop. Indeed, if anything is surprising, it is that this interventionism has
not been repudiated in the 1970's and 1980's.
An elusive sense ofjudicial propriety was found in what was styled the
"two-tiered test" for equal protection. No judgment was required. The test
was purely mechanical. On the lower tier, the inquiry was whether there
was any relationship, on any set of facts, between means and ends. On the
higher tier, the inquiry was whether there were other means that fit this
purpose more snugly. While there is room for fair argument on the desira-
bility of that approach, and some dispute on whether it ever was in fact
realized,' it is now clear that the two-tiered analytic framework has col-
lapsed. Any number of factors may have contributed to that collapse, in-
cluding lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the approach; questions
regarding the workability of such a mechanistic, nonjudgmental technique;
questions of general institutional competency; and even the inevitable reac-
tion of the Hegelian dialectic. A newly found political conservatism might
also be involved.
The Court has been creating a new role for itself since the 1960's, and
equal protection happened to be the vehicle it chose. While the clause his-
torically may have had a specific purpose, the presence of such general lan-
guage was bound to attract the attention of an activist Court.
The due process clause was unable to accommodate the Court's mod-
ern vision. The variety of opinions and the strange line-ups of justices in
Griswold v. Connecticut,9 the contraceptive case, suggested that substantive or
judgmental due process was not the right vehicle. The reaction to Roe V.
Wade,10 the abortion case, marked the effective limit of significant due pro-
cess activity. The struggle in Griswold to find a "penumbra" represented an
8. See Forum. Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645
(1975) (panel discussion with Professors Jesse Choper, Ray Forrester, Gerald Gun-
ther, and Philip Kurland).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, "found" the
right to use contraceptives in the Bill of Rights. Justice Goldberg's concurring opin-
ion, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, noted that the ninth
amendment recognized the right. Id at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). For Justice
Harlan, concurring, basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty-sub-
stantive due process-were involved. Id at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). For Jus-
tice White, concurring, the state statute worked a deprivation of "liberty" as that
concept is used in the fourteenth amendment. Id at 502 (White, J., concurring).
For Justice Black, dissenting, joined by Justice Stewart, the right was not found in
the Constitution and therefore the Court should not legislate it. Id at 507 (Black,
J., dissenting). For Justice Stewart, dissenting, joined by Justice Black, it was a silly
law with which he philosophically disagreed, but it was not unconstitutionally
vague and the procedures at the trial were constitutionally valid. Id at 527 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The public reaction is a matter of common
knowledge. For critical comment, compare Ely, The Wages of Cqing Wo/." 4 Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973), with Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972
(Vol. 48
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effort by a liberal court to avoid the appearance of legislating. That ap-
pearance came through vividly in the abortion cases. Perhaps the Court
should legislate in many areas, such as passing on the validity of state laws
that burden interstate commerce. If the court incorrectly evaluates the fed-
eral interest in that situation, Congress can act to correct the judgment."' It
is this ability of the legislature to correct the Court-or at least to relegislate
in the substantive area-that Justice Jackson found attractive when he
urged activity under equal protection rather than due process in his concur-
ring 1949 opinion in Railway Express Agency v. New York. 2 There had been
at that time no significant equal protection case invalidating legislation
apart from the area of race, except for Skinner v. Oklahoma,13 which was
equal protection in form but due process in substance.
Modern equal protection can be said to have begun in 1966, with
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.' There the Court talked about both
invidious discrimination and the right to vote. For Justice Black, in dissent,
the case represented no more than another use of the old "natural-law-due
process formula."' 5 That the case was about more than voting became
clear in 1969, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 16 where the Court struck down resi-
dency requirements for welfare benefits. Shapiro referred to certain funda-
mental rights, such as interstate travel, which were being burdened, if not
discriminated against, by the legislative category in question. The Court
seemed to be impressed with the relative importance of welfare to poor peo-
ple, as opposed to discrimination against out-of-state people for fishing and
hunting licenses or tuition-free education.
Two years after Harper, the Court decided a pair of suspect category
cases, Levy v. Louisiana 17 and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance
Co. " Levy invalidated a statute that barred unacknowledged illegitimate
children from recovering for the wrongful death of the mother. Glona
barred a mother from recovering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child. In both cases the Court purported to use a form of heightened scru-
tiny like that previously used in alienage' 9 and voting reapportionment
Term-Forward" Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1973).
11. Compare Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13
How.) 621 (1851), with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 355 (1855). See also G. CALABRESI, supra note 7.
12. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
13. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, struck
down a state's habitual criminal sterilization act. Justice Douglas stated that basic
civil rights, marriage and procreation, were involved in the case.
14. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Id at 676 (Black, J., dissenting).
16. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
17. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
18. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
19. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
1983]
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cases.2" Levy and Glona represented developments whose dimensions were
uncertain. The language of the opinions suggested that not all of the sus-
pect categories or fundamental rights requiring a higher degree of scrutiny
had been identified.
In 1969 a two-tiered approach was identified that seemed descriptively
accurate and serviceable.2' That approach had a very attractive feature: it
purported to call for no judgment, balancing, or evaluation of government
ends by the Court. With the lower tier, or traditional equal protection, one
could posit a governmental interest and suppose facts that created a rela-
tionship between the legislative means chosen and that governmental end.
The Court was called upon to make no qualitative judgments. By the same
token, the heightened or strict tier essentially asked whether the govern-
ment could accomplish its end through the use of other legislative categories
that did not involve suspect categories or burden fundamental rights. The-
oretically, the Court's invalidation of legislation did not preclude legislation
in the problem area.
22
In 1971, Reed v. Reed 23 and Graham v. Richardson2 4 were decided. Gen-
der and alienagejoined illegitimacy as suspect categories. In 1972, Profes-
sor Gunther called for a test related to means, not ends, to provide a
safeguard for the political process. He wanted the means evaluated in
terms of the articulated purpose, not some hypothetical one. 25 In this way,
the Court's function would still be nonjudgmental with regard to the legis-
lative ends.
26
In 1973, the fundamental interest line of cases was delimited in San
Antonio Independent School Dstrict v. Rodr'guez,2 7 a case that was no more
about education than was Brown v. Board ofEducation .28 The issue was one of
20. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2.
22. The only substantive or qualitative judgment made by the Court occurred
when the state advanced administrative convenience as its interest in the legislative
category. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), the Court held that this
interest was not factually demonstrated by the state. That matter seems to have
been transmogrified from a question of fact to a question of law. Subsequent cases
involving durational residency treated administrative convenience as if it were not
an important governmental concern. This was expressed in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), when the plurality cast on the government the burden of
proving that its decision on procedures was economically wise.
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
25. See Gunther, supra note 3.
26. The fourteenth amendment did not preempt any of the state's residual po-
lice power to legislate for the general welfare except the express provision relating to
the requirements of state citizenship and its implicit limitations on racial
discrimination.
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 48
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institutional competency. Justice Powell, for the majority, and Justice Mar-
shall, for the dissent, wrote thoughtful and balanced opinions. The area of
their disagreement was small but significant. Due process prohibits govern-
mental action, but equal protection does not. As a practical matter, equal
protection actually mandates more extensive governmental action. For Jus-
tice Powell, enforcing equality of education, as opposed to equality of ex-
penditures, was an impossible task for the judiciary. The provision of
minimum just wants-however socially desirable they might be-was not
entrusted to the article III branch of government. The idea of equality of
condition 29 was cabined, and with it the nonjudgmental two-tiered ap-
proach became impossible brittle. Its artificiality was revealed. Even the
limiting notion that fundamental rights had to be found implicitly or ex-
plicitly in the Constitution had to fall as a nonjudgmental equal protection
device. The case of Zablocki v. Redhail'° engendered as many opinions, six,
as did Griswold v. Connecticutt.3 While nominally an equal protection case,
Zablocki-which invalidated a restriction on remarriage by persons who
were not supporting children from prior marriages--clearly involved the
subjective and judgmental balancing of the state's interest in a natural law-
due process formulation.
The inventory of suspect categories was also closed. The new catego-
ries the Court was urged to treat as suspect in the early 1970's, such as
poverty, lacked important causation elements.32 Poverty is socially caused
and, given our system, is not attributable to state action. On the other
hand, certain immutable characteristics of birth, such as race and gender,
seem inappropriate categories for legislation, except where disabilities are
socially caused and the legislation is ameliorative. In both Reed v. Reed 33
and Bolling v. Sharpe,"' the actual holding of the Court was that there was
no relationship between the category chosen and the state interest asserted,
where the legislation imposed legal barriers on the socially disadvantaged
group. Benign classifications thus may be a different matter.35 Invidious
discrimination involving gender and race arguably fails even minimum
29. See Wilkinson, supra note 4.
30. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A brief summary of the various opinions in Griswold is
set forth in note 9 supra.
32. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). Professor Michelman's prescient piece remains the definitive
treatment of the area. See Michelman, supra note 5.
33. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
34. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Boiling involved the segregated schools of the District
of Columbia, and the challenge was mounted under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment rather than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
35. For a discussion of the difficulties in defining what is "benign," see
Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. PrrT. L. REV.
285 (1977). Cf Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
1983]
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scrutiny. The other two suspect classifications, alienage and illegitimacy,
are different in that they are legal categories, not physical categories attend-
ing the circumstances of birth.
The impulses that suggest treating gender as a category requiring some
form of heightened judicial scrutiny are not based on the same historical
background as those that warrant so treating race.3' Similarly, there are
significant differences between the past treatment of aliens and illegiti-
mates, which suggest that these legally created categories should not be
lumped together for identical nondiscriminating judicial solicitude. There
also is no reason to apply the same standard of review to congressional en-
actments involving suspect categories as is applied to state enactments.
3 7
For one thing, considerations of federalism are not the same as considera-
tions of separation of powers and issues of institutional competency.
In 1976, the attempt to apply strict scrutiny to all suspect category
cases was abandoned in favor of a test that looked for substantial relation-
ships to important actual governmental interests, even if not articulated.
This Article now will describe the movement away from the two-tiered
approach and then analyze the intermediate level of review to see if the
Court can avoid the charges-already leveled at it under due process-that
it is legislating its own values, a charge which increased activity under equal
protection was designed to avoid.
III. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND TIER
A. Alienage
Alienage was recognized by Tussman and tenBroek as a category
marked for concern under the equal protection clause. 31 State regulations
had been invalidated on preemption grounds. 3' The wrongness of alienage
as a suspect category triggering a pure means analysis was manifest from
the beginning. Graham v. Richardson,4° which started it all by striking down
state laws restricting welfare payments to resident aliens, begins, "These are
welfare cases. They provide yet another aspect of the widening litigation in
this area."4 1 The Court then cites as examples Shapiro v. Thompson4 2 and
36. References based on color of skin seem only of social, rather than physical
or biological origin.
37. Professor Gunther says the "synonymousness" of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments is "well established," except where there are special national interests
like alienage. See Forum.: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 645, 676 (1975). For Professor Karst, there is a basic rule of congruence. See
Karst, The Fifh Amendment5s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N. CAR. L. REV. 541
(1977). But see Seeburger, supra note 35; cf. Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, CJ.).
38. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 376.
39. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
40. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
41. Id at 366.
[Vol. 48
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Goldberg v. Kell ,y among others. Obviously what follows regarding aliens
is suspect.
First, Shapiro was not about welfare. The only judicially enforceable
provision of just wants occurs where the state itself has entered the field,
such as in divorces,' voting,4 5 or criminal appeals,4 6 and has demanded
exclusivity of its activity. Provision of housing, food, or education is proce-
durally entirely different.
Second, Goldberg itself is suspect. It makes sense only if there was a
duty to provide welfare. The "property" interest to be protected by proce-
dural due process is dependent on state law. That property was the entitle-
ment-procedurally enforceable retroactively by access to state court-to
payments for that period in which the criteria for eligibility were met,
rather than payments for a period until it had been determined that the
criteria were not met. The Court thus created a new vested state property
interest out of an expectancy.
That Graham is correctly decided on its alternative ground as a pre-
emption case seems beyond serious dispute. That there should be height-
ened scrutiny because aliens are a discrete and insular minority within the
meaning of the Carolene Products footnote4 7 is not apparent. The only rele-
vant citations are to TMax 48 and Takahashi,49 but the discussion in those
cases is not addressed to suspectness of category but only to the absence of
any compelling state interest. The state interest is lacking precisely because
of the paramount or preemptive federal interest. The Court need not, and
frequently ought not, search to find in the Constitution a clause or a phrase
that justifies invalidating state legislation.50
To classify alienage as suspect is to do one of two things. Either it is to
say that the category has a significance independent from its relation to the
weight of the state interest, thus needlessly confusing the judgmental and
evaluative process, or it is to be deadly serious about review of suspect cate-
gories, which is strict in theory and fatal in fact. The latter certainly
seemed to be the case in In re Griffiths"i and Sugarman v. Dougall,52 where
state interests of colorable legitimacy were denigrated by the Court.
42. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
44. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
45. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
46. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
47. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
48. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
49. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
50. See C. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
51. 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (admission to the state bar).
52. 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state civil service employment).
19831
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Then, in 1976, the Court decided two cases involving congressional
regulations governing aliens, which had been invalidated by understanda-
bly confused lower courts. In Mathews v. Diaz5 3 and Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong 54 the Court boilerplated the fourteenth amendment equal protection
standards onto the fifth amendment, ignoring the notion that the choice of
means is the essence of the legislative power, which the Constitution has
vested in Congress, a co-equal branch. The boilerplating process implies
that considerations of separation of powers are identical with considerations
of federalism. There is simply no reason in logic or history to apply the
same standard of review to Congress under the fifth amendment that is
applied to the states under the fourteenth. The Court did recognize that
the same standard of review could not always be applied to Congress in the
alienage area. Unfortunately, rather than recognizing the inappropriate-
ness of the alternative suspect category holding in Graham and rejecting
equal protection notions as inapplicable, thus limiting the holding to struc-
tural preemption, the Court "solved" the problem by discerning a second
and more deferential equal protection clause in the fifth amendment where
the naked eye can find none.
The weakness of the suspect category approach under the fourteenth
amendment was heightened when a Maryland law excluding aliens from
grand or petty juries was summarily upheld on appeal. 55 This disparate
treatment of alienage as suspect continued in 1977 with Fiallo v. Bell5" and
Nyquist v. Mauciet,57 both of which were properly decided.
The functional importance of Graham's equal protection alternative
holding began to erode as the focus of review shifted from the significance
53. 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (denial of Medicare benefits to certain aliens upheld).
54. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (civil service employment regulations invalidated).
55. Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
56. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Federal law discriminated against illegitimates in
granting immigration preferences. The Court, relying on Hampton, said that power
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial
review. It felt it would not be a proper judicial role in cases of that sort to probe
and test the justifications for the congressional decision.
57. 432 U.S. 1 (1977). A state statute required that recipients of certain schol-
arships and loans for higher education be citizens, or have made application for
citizenship, or file a statement affirming their intent to apply for citizenship as soon
as they qualified, or be within the class of refugees paroled by the attorney general.
This was held to discriminat& against a class. It was subject to strict scrutiny since it
was directed at aliens and only aliens were harmed by it, even though its bar
against them was not absolute. The distinctions made in the statute thus seem to be
matters of only federal, not state, interest. The Court said, "The governmental
interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to
determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be
made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely
drawn." Id. at 7.
[Vol. 48
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of the category to the legitimacy of the state interest. In Foley v. Connelie,58
the Court recognized that it would be inappropriate to require every statu-
tory exclusion of aliens by the state to clear the high hurdle of strict scru-
tiny. Scrutiny, said the Court, would not be so demanding when it deals
with matters firmly within a state's constitutional prerogatives. In Ambach v.
Norwick, 9 the Court, while acknowledging Graham, went back to the public
interest doctrine of pre-Graham cases.
Finally, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,6° a five justice majority stated:
Since Graham, the Court has confronted claims distinguishing be-
tween the economic and sovereign functions of government. This
distinction has been supported by the argument that although cit-
izenship is not a relevant ground for the distribution of economic
benefits, it is a relevant ground for determining membership in
the political community.6 '
A test that turns on the nature of the state or federal interest is hardly a
means test. Where there has been no sovereign function, strict review has
been fatal in fact. Where there is one, review is relaxed. Interestingly, the
Cabell dissent makes a convincing case of both over- and underinclusiveness,
which must have caused the category to fall on anything other than a mini-
mum rationality test.
As if to illustrate the inutility of equal protection approaches to alien-
age, two very interesting cases were decided in June 1982, on what are es-
sentially preemption grounds. That both state regulations disadvantaged
only some aliens was not used as a reason for not treating the categories as
suspect. In one case, the Court found that Maryland's attempt to bar the
58. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). A New York statute limiting appointment of mem-
bers of the state police force to citizens of the United States was upheld since citi-
zenship may be a relevant qualification for those important nonelective positions
held by officers who participate directly in the execution of broad public policy.
"The state need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relation-
ship between the interests sought to be protected and the limiting classification."
Id at 296.
59. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). A New York statute which precluded from employ-
ment as elementary and secondary public school teachers those aliens eligible for
United States citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization was held to bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in furthering its educational goals.
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from the
public-interest doctrine of Truax's day, they have not abandoned the gen-
eral principle that some state functions are so bound up with the opera-
tion of the state as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from
those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of
self-government . . . . The exclusion of aliens from such governmental
positions would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this court.
Id at 73-74.
60. 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (upholding state's citizenship requirement for position
of deputy probation officer).
61. Id at 438.
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resident children of diplomats from higher education benefits was in fact
preempted by federal statutes and regulations.62 The second case involved
Texas's refusal to provide public school education for illegal aliens. 63 While
the invalidation of the statute did not turn on express preemption, the
Court satisfied itself that the invalidation would cause no significant hard-
ship to the state in fact and was in accord with congressional desires. The
focus of the case was the end, the national problem of illegal immigration,
rather than the means.
When the alienage category falls, it is because of the absence of any
state regulatory power; there is a preemptive federal interest in uniformity.
Equal protection adds nothing as an analytical tool and can only be a cause
for confusion.'
B. Illegiimay
Illegitimacy, like alienage, is not an immutable characteristic and is
not necessarily determined at birth, as is the case with gender and race.
The use of any of these four categories in legislation might attach legal
disabilities to an individual at birth, but gender and race are physical char-
acteristics while alienage and illegitimacy are based on the pre-existing, val-
idly imposed, legal characteristics of the parents. A baby is illegitimate
because the parents are not married. A baby is an alien because when he
was born outside this country his parents were not citizens. Thus, treat-
ment of illegitimacy as a suspect category triggering strict scrutiny is ini-
tially a dubious proposition because the status is in fact produced by a
relationship validly regulated by the state. A strict analysis which purports
to be purely means related-that is, one taking no account of the state in-
terest, as in the alienage cases-must also ultimately fail as a judicial tool.
Recent cases indicate that the Court is moving to a position that
should have been initially clear from a careful reading of the facts in Levy v.
Louisiana65 and from an appreciation of Justice Harlan's dissent in that
62. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
63. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The case is discussed in detail in text
accompanying notes 152-55 infra.
64. A vivid example of the difficulties this kind of judicial intervention can
cause is seen in the case of the injunction issued against selective enforcement of the
deportation laws against Iranians. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). If the action discriminates, it is only
among aliens and not between aliens and citizens. The issue is whether treating
aliens differently because of their national origin is invidious in that context. It
certainly cannot be called irrational, because foreign policy deals with nations, not
individuals. These aliens are treated differently because of their nationality and
relations with their homeland, a relationship to which personal attributes are irrele-
vant. Here again, the language of equal protection confuses rather than assists
analysis.
65. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, illegitimate children, members of the house-
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case.66 Strict scrutiny language sometimes masks the fact that the legisla-
tive category does not even meet minimum rationality.6 7 Differential treat-
ment of an illegitimate, as opposed to differential treatment of his or her
parent, can further no articulable state policy. Punishing the child for the
sins of the parent has not been advanced as one. In addition, imposition of
disabilities on the child presents serious due process problems. Levy in-
volved the denial of a benefit extended to others being cared for in the
family home who happened to be legitimate children. There was nothing
the individual child could do to come within the provisions of the wrongful
death statute. That the natural parent could have made the child legiti-
mate does not alter the right of the child.
The case that causes confusion if read too broadly is Glona ,68 the com-
panion case to Levy. In Glona, the illegitimate mother was denied a right
under the wrongful death act, although for most every purpose under Loui-
siana law she was treated as if she were a legitimate mother. The basis of
the decision was the absence of a rational relationship. The Court cited
More v. Doud.69 Treatment of illegitimacy as a suspect category was not
essential to the decision.
70
In Labine v. Vincent 7 1 the Court upheld a Louisiana law that prohibited
even acknowledged illegitimates from inheriting in intestacy, applying min-
imal scrutiny. It chose to recognize the state interest in the "legal family"
relationship, an interest which counted not at all in Levy or Glona.
The Court's approaches in these cases were plainly inconsistent,
whether or not the results were. The problem was confronted by Justice
Powell in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,72 where unacknowledged ille-
gitimates received workers' compensation benefits through the injured fa-
ther only if the benefits were not exhausted by the claims of legitimate
hold, were denied the right of recovery under the Louisiana wrongful death statute
for the death of their mother.
66. Id at 76 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For Justice Harlan, the biological rela-
tionship required by the court was no less arbitrary than the legal relationship it
invalidated. He stated that neither a biological relationship nor a legal acknowl-
edgement is indicative of the love or economic dependence that may exist between
two persons.
67. This was the case in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in which the
Court held that racial segregation in the District of Columbia schools had no ra-
tional relationship to any educational purpose and was thus invalid under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
68. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
69. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
70. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is the same sort of case. Rather
than looking at marriage as a suspect category or fornication as a fundamental
right, the Court simply found no relationship between the means chosen by the
state and the accomplishment of the stated objective of the statute.
71. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
72. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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children and acknowledged illegitimates. The statute's discrimination did
not include all illegitimates, and Justice Powell correctly identified the issue
as concerning persons similarly situated, i.e., dependent children. 73 Justice
Powell concluded that Levy, not Labine, was the applicable precedent. 74 He
recognized the presence of a state interest in the promotion of the legal
family relationship, a recognition not granted in Ley. But unlike Labine,
the existence of a rational relationship between the category and the state
interest to be advanced was not enough. Justice Powell could not see a
"significant" factual relationship. As Professor Gunther properly pointed
out, the case involved something other than either strict scrutiny or mini-
mum rationality.
75
The language in Weber remained a trap for the unwary because of ref-
erences to the social opprobrium attaching to the accident of birth. Subse-
quently, in Gomez v. Perez,76 the Court struck down a Texas law denying
illegitimates the right to support orders from their fathers. Such discrimi-
nation was found to be "invidious." But such a statute would be equally
invalid if applied to all dependent children born in even numbered years.
The fact is that as dependent children they are similarly situated. The cate-
gory of illegitimacy furthers neither factually nor logically any suggested or
conceivable state purpose.
The seeming lack of a settled approach continued in 1976, when the
Court upheld those provisions of the Social Security Act that conditioned
the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving child's insur-
ance benefits upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claim-
ant child's parent and at the time of his death was living with the child or
was contributing to his support. 77 A legitimate child was automatically
considered to be dependent. The Court recognized that Congress's purpose
in adopting the statutory presumption of dependency was to serve adminis-
trative convenience. The Court noted that this was not a case of strictest
scrutiny, where such approximations or presumptions would have to be
supported by a showing that the government's dollar loss in overincluding
benefit recipients is greater than the saving from avoiding administrative
73. To the same effect is Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). A provi-
sion of the Social Security Act denying disability benefits to some-but not all-
illegitimate children born after the wage earner parent's disability was held uncon-
stitutional. Strict scrutiny was not applied and the legitimacy of the interest in
preventing spurious claims was recognized. The Court concluded that the Act's
conclusive denial of an opportunity to establish dependency did not adequately
serve the purpose of the Act.
74. One might wonder at this juncture how the Court would have approached
the problem of a dependent illegitimate child complaining about dilution of his
wrongful death recovery through having to share with a non-dependent legitimate
one.
75. See Gunther, sura note 3.
76. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
77. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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hearing expenses."8 The Court also noted that the statute was not broadly
discriminatory. Certain illegitimates, such as those who had been acknowl-
edged in writing or who had been the beneficiary of a court's support order,
had the benefit of the presumption of dependency. It is worth noting that
this case involved an act of Congress.
The following year, in Timble v. ordon, Justice Powell again applied
something less than the strictest scrutiny but struck down a state law. An
Illinois probate provision allowing illegitimate children to inherit only from
their mothers was defended on that ground that it promoted legitimate
family relationships and made estate administration easier. The Illinois act
was more broadly discriminatory than the Louisiana act in Labine8 ° and, in
any event, the Court noted that the difference in the rights of illegitimate
children in the estates of their mothers and fathers appears to be unrelated
to the purpose of promoting family relationships. Referring to the state's
interest in establishing a method of property disposition, the Court noted
that the court below had failed to consider the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion of all illegitimates and
the burden of case by case determination of paternity.
Such an intermediate means-focused approach was brought before the
Court in the 1978 case of Lalli v. Lai.8 While there was no majority opin-
ion, the concurrences make it clear that the category does not invoke strict-
est scrutiny. Involved was New York's requirement of a judicial proceeding
declaring paternity sometime before the father's death in order for the ille-
gitimate to inherit. The dissent thought the requirement ofjudicial filiation
too drastic, that public acknowledgments of paternity or an elevated stan-
dard of proof would serve the state interest of precluding fraudulent
claims.82 The plurality opinion noted that few statutory classifications are
entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable
results. It would seem that any intermediate step, the absence of which was
the fatal flaw in Trinmble, would be sufficient. All that can be required under
equal protection is that the legislature address the problem-not that it
come up with a solution that a majority of the Court thinks is the
"fairest. ' ' s 3
78. The Court cited Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See note 22
.rupra.-
79. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
80. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
81. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
82. Id at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. In response to the invalidation of its law precluding illegitimates from ob-
taining support orders against their fathers, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973),
Texas provided that the illegitimate must get the support order within one year of
birth. Without dissent, the Court invalidated the provision. Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91 (1982). The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist noted that the pro-
cedures need not be co-terminal with those for legitimate children since the illegiti-
mate has a different element of proof, i.e., paternity. Applying intermediate
19831
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Three more cases involving the category of illegitimacy arose in 1979.
They all were of the Glona type,8 4 imposing disabilities on parents of illegiti-
mate children rather than on the children themselves. The challenges on
illegitimacy grounds were unsuccessful.85
In the area of illegitimacy it is well settled that the children themselves
cannot be subject to legal disabilities which they cannot unilaterally alter,
since such disabilities do not relate to the valid state interest in the legal
relationship between the parents, a relationship that the child cannot deter-
mine. The parents who are themselves the cause of their status can be
subject to legal disabilities distinct from those of married parents, although
generally not distinct because of gender. The question for the future is the
extent of those disabilities. The state interest in procedural regularity in the
administration of estates, for instance, is sufficient to justify rules that pre-
clude natural parents from the right to ad hoc determination that they are
in fact "similarly situated" with married parents because of their legal
status.86
The requirement of the equal protection clause in the illegitimacy
area, then, is only procedural. The substantive state interest is not deni-
grated by the requirement of procedures. To that end it would appear that
any reasonable procedure the state comes up with, as opposed to the fairest
scrutiny, the Court found that the provision was not substantially related to impor-
tant governmental interests since no important evidence would invariably be lost
nor would the passage of time appreciably increase fraudulent claims. The statute
did not provide a reasonable opportunity.
84. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
85. In the first of these cases, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), the
Court upheld a Georgia statute which precluded a father who had not legitimated
his child from suing for the wrongful death of that child. The plurality opinion
applied minimum rationality to the illegitimacy category, noting that the statute
did not impose different burdens or award different benefits to legitimate children
and that the appellant was responsible for fostering an illegitimate child and then
failing to change its status. The second case, Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979),
involved a challenge to a Social Security Act provision which restricted "mothers'
insurance benefits" to widows and divorced wives of wage earners and denied them
to the mother of an illegitimate child. The Court said that Congress could reason-
ably conclude that a woman who has never been married to the wage earner is far
less likely to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death, that he
was never legally required to support her, that he was less likely to have been an
important source of income to her, and that the possibility of severe economic dislo-
cation upon his death was therefore more remote. The Court, recognizing that
some dependent women might be excluded, applied only the rational relationship
test because the discrimination was not against illegitimate children. The dissent
based its argument on the impact of the statute on illegitimate children rather than
the discrimination against unmarried parents. The final case, Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), involved the adoption of illegitimates but was decided on
gender-based discrimination rather than illegitimacy.
86. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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one they could have, will suffice. Language of "suspect category" has only
confused the issue. It hides the nature and value of the state interest.
C. Gender-Based Discrimination
The collapse of the purportedly two-tiered approach is most plainly
seen in the area of gender-based discrimination. Gender, like race, turns on
immutable physical characteristics determined at birth. For better or
worse, society traditionally has recognized and imposed gender-based dis-
tinctions. Today, it is generally accepted that most, if not all, legally im-
posed gender-based disabilities are irrationally overbroad, although there
are tangible differences between the sexes. On the other hand, it seems rea-
sonably clear that the insertion of the equal protection clause into the four-
teenth amendment contemplated no special role for the Court.
This ambivalence is clearly reflected in the first of the modern gender-
based discrimination cases, Reed v. Reed,8 7 decided in 1971. Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, purported to adopt a minimum
rationality test, involving no departure from established doctrine, to invali-
date a mandatory Idaho probate provision that gave preference to the fa-
ther in a case where both of the decedent's parents filed for letters of
administration. But one can suppose a set of facts that would sustain the
legislative judgment. It probably is true even today that any man about
whom you know nothing is more likely to be experienced in those business
skills relating to settling an estate than any woman about whom you know
nothing. The Court addressed this problem and concluded that such a
mandatory preference could not be used merely to accomplish the elimina-
tion of hearings on the merits. But this conclusion merely restates the prob-
lem. Legislative categories are meant to deal with problems in gross,
without individual determinations or hearings on the merits, and such cate-
gories are almost always either over- or underinclusive. The use of legisla-
tive categories is meant to avoid making ad hoc or individual
determinations.
The reluctance to confront this basic question of crude legislative cate-
gories manifested itself in the "irrebuttable presumption" line of cases
under the due process clause.88 The attractiveness to the Court of that ap-
87. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidated mandatory Idaho probate provision that
gave preference to father in a case where decedent's parents each filed for letters of
administration).
88. The line began with Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In Vlandis, a
statute created a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that, for tuition purposes,
a state university student who was a nonresident for the entire period of his attend-
ance. The presumption was not necessarily or universally true, and the state had
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination:
We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresi-
dence-the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve that legitimate in-
terest-is violative of the Due Process Clause, because it provides no
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proach becomes apparent when one compares it with what the justices were
opportunity for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate
that they have become bona fide Connecticut residents. The State can
establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually
certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State,
but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take ad-
vantage of the in-state rates.
Id at 453-454. In USDA v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), the same technique was
used to invalidate an act of Congress. A statute denied households food stamp eligi-
bility solely because they contained persons 18 years old or older who had been
claimed as dependents for federal income tax purposes by taxpayers who were
themselves ineligible for food stamp relief. This was held to be an irrational meas-
ure of the need of the household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent
lived because it rested on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. The
Court found that it lacked the critical ingredients of due process:
We have difficulty in concluding that it is rational to assume that a child
is not an indigent this year because the parent declared the child as depen-
dent in his tax return for the prior year. . . .We conclude that the de-
duction taken for the benefit of the parent in that prior year is not a
rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child
of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable presumption
often contrary to fact.
I1d at 514.
To the same effect was USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). A different
provision of the Food Stamp Act allowed participation by households of related
persons but excluded households containing one or more unrelated persons. This
was held rationally related to neither the chapter's stated purposes-maintaining
adequate nutrition and stimulating the agricultural economy-nor the goal of min-
imizing fraud in the administration of the program. It thus violated the equal pro-
tection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause. "[Tihe
classification here in issue," said the Court, "is not only imprecise, it is wholly with-
out any rational basis." Id at 538. But compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974), in which the Court upheld an ordinance restricting land use to
one-family dwellings and excluding more than two unrelated people from living
together as a housekeeping unit. One who took account of governmental ends
would note that family relationship is a matter of legitimate state concern, but not a
delegated federal end.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court
held that mandatory maternity leave rules-which required a pregnant school
teacher to take unpaid maternity leave months before the expected childbirth and
provided for reinstatement only upon tender of a physician's certificate of physical
fitness-violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The Court found
that the arbitrary cutoff dates in the mandatory leave rules had no rational rela-
tionship to the state's valid interest in preserving the continuity of instruction and
that it created a conclusive presumption that every teacher who is four or five
months pregnant is physically incapable of continuing her duties. "Because public
school maternity leave rules directly affect one of the basic civil rights of man, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that such rules must not
needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this vital area of a teacher's
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attempting under the equal protection clause. First and foremost, the jus-
tices liked its surface textual legitimacy. The Court purported to rely on
that part of the fourteenth amendment that all critics would admit was
appropriate for the Court to concern itself with: procedural due process.
No balancing of state interests against substantive rights, wherever found,
was required. 9 In these log-jam breaking cases, no evaluation of proce-
dures by the Court was required since the use of statutory irrebuttable pre-
sumptions meant there was no procedure at all.
In the term after Reed, the Court decided Frontiero v. Richardson,' a
"federal" case, in which it struck down regulations treating male and fe-
male service personnel differently when allocating spousal benefits. The
Court's trespass on Congress's power can be seen by recalling Chief Justice
constitutional liberty." Id at 640. The Court "thus conclude[d] that the arbitrary
cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules ... [had] no rational relation-
ship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of instruction." Id. at 643
(emphasis added).
The last successful challenge using this approach was Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974). The Social Security Act did not permit illegitimate children
born after their father became entitled to disability or death insurance benefits to
receive any benefits. This was held to deny the equal protection of the law guaran-
teed by the due process provisions of the fifth amendment. "The complete statutory
bar to disability benefits imposed upon nonlegitimated afterborn illegitimates in
appellant's position, is not reasonably related to the valid governmental interests of
preventing spurious claims." Id at 629 (emphasis added). Note that the Court
talked about reasonableness rather than rationality in this puzzling opinion.
This line of cases came to an end in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975),
which upheld a provision of the Social Security Act denying benefits to surviving
wives and stepchildren unless the relationship had existed for nine months prior to
the wage-earner's death. The Court, after commenting on the degree of judicial
involvement in the legislative function involved in the irrebuttable presumption
line of cases, noted that such involvement was inconsistent with the broad latitude
accorded economic regulations under both the due process clause, see Williamson v.
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and the equal protection clause, see Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89. This approach has been characterized as an invitation to the political
branch to "reconsider the matter and determine explicitly whether a gender dis-
crimination was needed to accomplish any purpose at all." Burt, The Constitution of
the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 381. The role of the court with reference to
outdated or unjust statutes was the focus of the 1978 Holmes Lectures. See G. CAL-
ABRESI, supra note 7.
90. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court held that requiring a female Air Force
employee who sought housing and medical benefits for her spouse to prove his de-
pendence upon her for over half of his support, while not requiring such proof of a
male employee seeking similar benefits for his wife, solely for the purpose of avoid-
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Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maqland;91 in talking about the choices
of means open to Congress, he clearly differentiated the legislative power
referred to in article I from the judicial power in article III. It is difficult to
conceive of that legislative power being differently interpreted if there had
been no necessary and proper clause in the Constitution. At the time of
McCulloch the fifth amendment was already in existence. Since then, Con-
gress has been given additional legislative authority in section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment.9 2 Frontiero marked the first time in our history that the
Court voided an act of Congress related to a subject matter admittedly del-
egated to it where no substantive right implicitly or explicitly derived from
the Bill of Rights was involved. The act was invalid only because the Court
disagreed with Congress's choice of means. Four members of the majority
thought that a degree of scrutiny beyond minimum rationality-that is,
beyond what would satisfy McCulloch-was called for.93 The fifth thought
the case governed by Reed. Of course, Reed involved an entirely different
part of the Constitution; the fourteenth amendment, not the fifth. Though
the plurality talked in terms of strict scrutiny, it stated that the provision
would survive if the government showed the economic wisdom of its deci-
sion. The requirement that a female member of the armed forces demon-
strate the dependency of her spouse before receiving the dependent
allowance (when men could obtain such benefits by affidavit) would be up-
held if the government showed it cost more to give the allowance for all
male dependents than to conduct the individual determinations. In practi-
cal terms, the imposition of suspectness on the category of gender by casting
the burden of justification on the government reversed the normal pre-
sumption of validity. But that was only a plurality opinion.
The fact that gender had not yet been held suspect was instrumental
the following year in upholding a state category preferring widows over
widowers.94 The minimum rationality test was continued9 5 when the Court
91. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). ChiefJustice Marshall wrote that "we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." Id at 407. He continued:
But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This
court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.
Id at 423.
92. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
93. 411 U.S. at 688 ("[W]e can only conclude that classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin are inherently
suspect and must therefore be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.").
94. In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), Florida's grant of an annual $500
property tax exemption to widows, while not offering an analogous benefit to wid-
owers, was held not to violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
since the discrimination was founded upon the reasonable distinction in state policy
of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom the loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.
95. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), might be an exception. There the
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sustained the benignly differential treatment of female naval personnel in
Schlesinger v. Ballard,96 but it wavered somewhat when the Court struck
down a state law which placed the age of majority for support purposes at
twenty-one for males but only eighteen for females.
97
Finally, a unanimous Court in Weinberger v. Weisenfed 98 invalidated a
congressional act excluding widowers but not widows from Social Security
survivor benefits, although the majority opinion purported only to apply
minimum rationality. This is the watershed equal protection opinion, in
that it exposes the weaknesses, theoretical and operational, of the two-tiered
approach in gender discrimination cases. The Court held that the purpose
of the payment was to enable the widow to remain home with minor chil-
dren, thus irrationally discriminating among surviving children solely be-
cause of the gender of the surviving parent. The Court determined for itself
what the "actual" purpose of the statute was. The Court seemed to say that
the act was unconstitutional not because Congress was without power to
pass this particular piece of legislation but because the Court believed the
Congress really was trying to accomplish some other legislative end. That
anyone would attempt to read the collective mind of Congress (and what
an assumption is therein contained) is novel enough. That the validity of
legislation otherwise admittedly within Congress's power would turn upon
such a reading by a branch of only co-equal authority is downright
startling.
Fortunately, the Court abandoned the two-tiered approach the follow-
ing year. Something less than strict scrutiny but more than minimal ration-
ality was expressly held to be the applicable test in gender-based
Court held that California's disability insurance system, which excluded the disabil-
ities that accompany normal pregnancy and childbirth, did not invidiously discrim-
inate. The Court said that there was no risk from which men were protected that
women were not nor was there any risk from which women were protected and men
were not.
96. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). The Court upheld a statutory scheme that accorded
women naval officers a 13-year tenure of commission to service before mandatory
discharge for want of a promotion but which required the mandatory discharge of
male officers who were twice passed over for promotion but who might have less
than 13 years of commission service. "The complete rationality of this legislative
classification is underscored by the fact that in corps where male and female lieu-
tenants are similarly situated, Congress has not differentiated between them with
respect to tenure." Id at 509.
97. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
98. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Excluding widowers but not widows from the survi-
vor's benefits provided for by the Social Security Act was an unjustifiable discrimi-
nation against female wage earners required to pay Social Security taxes since it
afforded them less protection for their survivors than is provided for male wage
earners. The Court stated that the distinction was "entirely irrational." Id at 651.
1983]
21
Seeburger: Seeburger: Muddle of the Middle Tier:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
discrimination cases.9 9 The importance of the actual purpose of the statute
was downplayed when the Court articulated the new test in Craig v. Bo-
ren:100 "[C]lassification by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."10' This test was applied the following year in an illegitimacy
case. 102
As articulated, the intermediate test of means has two troublesome as-
pects. First, what is important to a state under its police powers would seem
to be a federal question to be decided by the Court. This is not an unfamil-
iar method under a due process balancing approach, but it undercuts the
force of Justice Jackson's argument for more activity under equal protec-
tion. Second, it is difficult to think about the relative degree of fit that
"substantial" suggests without thinking about the importance of the per-
sonal interest affected.
The Court in Califano v. Webster,"'3 in an unanimous per curiam opin-
ion, boilerplated the Craig fourteenth amendment test onto the fifth amend-
ment without discussion. As in the alienage cases, this wrongly ignores the
99. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, an Oklahoma statutory
scheme prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18 was held to constitute an invidious gender-based discrimination
that denied those males equal protection of the law:
Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us
that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drink-
ing and driving . . . . [T]he relationship between gender and traffic
safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that the gen-
der-based difference be substantially related to the achievement of the
statutory objective.
Id at 204.
100. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
101. Id at 197. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, did not seem to be
willing to give up on this point entirely, however. He "accept[ed] for purposes of
discussion the District Court's identification of the objective," which the State At-
torney General asserted was traffic safety. Id at 199. He did not believe it was self-
evident that this was the "true" purpose, as opposed to a "convenient but false post-
hoc rationalization." Id at 200 n.7.
102. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
103. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). A former provision of the Social Security Act which
allowed women a more favorable method of calculating retirement benefits was
held to work directly to remedy some of the effect of past employment discrimina-
tion and was thus not unconstitutional. Moreover, Congress's subsequent 1972
equalization of the treatment of men and women did not constitute an admission
by Congress that its previous policy was invidiously discriminatory, nor did its fail-
ure to make the 1972 amendment retroactive constitute discrimination on the basis
of date of birth. The Court stated: "To withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, classification by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." Id at 316-17.
[Vol. 48
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differences between state and federal interests. Gender might be relevant to
federal concerns when the congressional choice is to spend for the general
welfare rather than to regulate under its delegated powers. Where the fed-
eral concern is "dependency" or "financial need," invidious (as opposed to
benign or compensatory) discrimination along these lines can be viewed as
invalid, since it may be unrelated to or outside the federal concern. The
Court has had difficulty in gender-based discrimination in that area where
it has traditionally been viewed as relevant, both historically and factually,
to a paramount congressional interest-the regulation of the land and na-
val forces, at least in potential combat situations.4
The first half of 1979 saw no less than five full-blown opinions from the
Supreme Court dealing with gender-based discrimination. The most illu-
minating was Orr v. Orr.105 Justice Brennan, for the majority, examined
"the three governmental objectives that might arguably be served."' 106 Of
the validity of the first two, the Court said,
One is a legislative purpose to provide help for needy spouses, us-
ing sex as a proxy for need. The other is a goal of compensating
women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly
left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world
following divorce. We concede, of course, that assisting needy
spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective. We
have also recognized "[r]eduction of the disparity in economic
conditions between men and women caused by the long history of
discrimination against women . . . is . . . an important govern-
mental objective ....
The Court then applied a substantial relationship test, which began with
the analysis of whether sex was a sufficiently accurate proxy and whether
the compensation rationale was appropriate. It asked whether women had
in fact been significantly discriminated against in the sphere to which the
statute applied a sex-based classification, thus leaving the sexes not similarly
situated. But the Court concluded that there was nonetheless no reason to
104. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), which is discussed at note 96
supra, the Court did not address the question of the legitimacy of gender-based
discrimination in combat and sea duty, which distinctions were the basis for up-
holding the regulations challenged there. The same unchallenged gender differen-
tial in combat duty, and with it the conclusion that men and women were thus not
similarly situated, was an important part of the decision to apply minimum ration-
ality in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the males-only draft registration
case.
105. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statutory scheme imposing alimony obliga-
tion on husbands but not on wives held invalid).
106. Id at 279. Justice Brennan took an institutionally conservative position
regarding the statute's real purpose when he said, "Of course, if upon examination
it becomes clear that there is not substantial relationship between the statutes and
the purported objectives, this may well indicate that these objectives were not the
statute's goals in the first place." Id.
107. Id. at 280.
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use sex as a proxy for need because individual hearings at which the parties'
relative financial circumstances might be considered had already occurred.
That this may have been the case in Reed does not appear.'
08
A third arguable governmental objective in Orr was a preference for an
allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife played a depen-
dent role. This was substantively rejected as a valid governmental purpose,
just like disabilities based on illegitimacy. It thus appears that gender clas-
sification for the sake of gender classification-just like segregation for the
sake of segregation albeit in separate but equal facilities-is per se invalid.
Two other cases involving gender-based discrimination also involved
illegitimacy. The first, Parham v. Hughes,10 9 upheld a state statute which
precluded a father who had not legitimated his child from suing for wrong-
ful death. The majority noted that mothers and fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren are not similarly situated; that is, the classification does not
discriminate against fathers but rather distinguishes between fathers who
have legitimated their children and those who have not. "o Thus, the ma-
jority concluded that only a minimum rationality test was applicable. The
majority noted that the constitutionality of the state law that required fa-
thers but not mothers to use the legitimation process was not challenged in
the case. The dissent argued that this was circular, that the issue before the
Court was whether the state may require unmarried fathers but not unmar-
ried mothers to have pursued a statutory legitimization procedure in order
to bring suit for the wrongful death of their children. The majority noted
the obvious, that the identity of the mother of an illegitimate child will
rarely be in doubt.
In the other gender-illegitimacy case, Caban v. Mohammed,"' the Court
confronted the question reserved in Q uilloin v. Wacot:m" 2 the right of the
father of an illegitimate child to withhold consent to an adoption. In Quil-
loin the particular father had not been "similarly situated," but in Caban the
father had his name on the birth certificate and had lived with the mother
and the children. After the couple separated, he frequently saw the chil-
dren and maintained contact with them. He had also tried to secure the
custody of the children before the mother and her new husband petitioned
for adoption. The Court noted that it was not confronted with a statute
addressed particularly to newborn adoptions, where more stringent require-
ments concerning acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter definition of
abandonment might be required. When dealing with older children, the
Court found no substantial relationship between the statute and the state's
interest in facilitating adoption of older illegitimate children, because there
108. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See text accompanying note 87 supra.
109. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
110. Id at 356. Compare Geduldig v. Aeillo, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) with Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
111. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
112. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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was no basis for finding a profound difference between the affection and
concerns of mothers and fathers. It was not argued that unwed fathers
would be more likely to object to adoption, and the Court could see no self-
evident reason why as a class they would be.
In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney ,113 a state life-long veteran's prefer-
ence in civil service was challenged. The Court upheld the statute, noting
that it was gender neutral on its face and that there was no argument that
the statute was a pretext for gender discrimination.
Finally, in the most interesting of the 1979 cases, Califano v. Westcott,114
the Court struck down that part of the Social Security Act which provided
benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of paren-
tal support because of the unemployment of the father but not of the
mother. The government made two arguments: first, that the provision did
not discriminate against women as a class although it incorporated a gender
distinction; and second, the need to deter real or pretended desertion by
fathers. The Court had little difficulty with the first argument.1 15 As to the
second, the Court could find no support for it in the legislative history. The
Court concluded that Congress had in mind an image of a traditional fam-
ily. Rather than rejecting this outright as a purpose, the Court made an
alternative determination. It assumed deterrence of desertion to be the pur-
pose but concluded the classification was not substantially related to the
achievement of that goal. The Court said that there was no evidence in the
legislative history or elsewhere that a father has less incentive to desert in a
family where the mother is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed than
in the family where the father is the breadwinner and becomes
unemployed.
The Court then confronted the very troublesome question of the form
of relief. Should families with unemployed fathers cease receiving benefits
or should families with unemployed mothers get them? It was clear that a
tremendous amount of money was involved. The Court said, "Whenever a
Court extends a benefits program to redress unconstitutional under-inclu-
siveness, it risks infringing legislative prerogatives."" 6 The Social Security
Commissioner proposed a cheaper remedy that would terminate some cur-
113. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
114. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
115. The Court disposed of the point briefly:
The Secretary's argument, at bottom, turns on the fact that the impact on
gender qualification is felt by family units rather than individuals. But
this Court has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications that re-
sult in benefits being granted or denied to family units on the basis of the
sex of the qualifying parent. . . .Here, as in those cases, the statute "dis-
criminates against one particular category of family-that in which the
female spouse is a wage-earner."
Id at 84 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 (1977)).
116. Id at 92.
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rent recipients' eligibility: limiting benefits to the situation where the prin-
cipal wage earner becomes unemployed, thus denying benefits to
unemployed fathers where the mother is the principal wage earner. The
Court decided that it was ill-equipped to estimate the relative costs of vari-
ous types of coverage or to gauge the effect that different levels of expendi-
tures would have upon the alleviation of human suffering. Under those
circumstances, said the Court, any fine-tuning of coverage along principal
wage earner lines, a new concept in the statute, should properly be left to
the democratic branches of government. The Court felt that the district
court's solution-rendering the act gender neutral-was the simplest and
most equitable extension possible."
7
Westcott was a difficult case because the test the Court had created for
itself in 1976, that of finding a substantial relationship to an important gov-
ernmental interest in gender-based discrimination cases, is easy to articulate
but almost impossible to apply as a purely means related test. The ques-
tions the tests ask are not traditional judicial questions. What is the govern-
mental interest? It is what the statute does? If so, then the relationship of
means to ends is perfectly congruent and thus always more than merely
substantial. How is a court to know whether the interest is important, as
opposed to merely legitimate, where the Constitution provides no liberty
interest to be weighed against it?
While there was an unusual number of cases in the October 1979 Term
117. Id. at 93. The Supreme Court, in invalidating a state law under the equal
protection clause, always treated the effect of the invalidation as a matter of state
law to be decided on remand to the state court. Either the general provision should
fall and the act be totally ineffective or only the subject matter coverage that was
offensive should fall (thus extending the coverage of the act). On remand to a lower
federal court there might properly be an occasion for the invocation of abstention,
as in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The extension of coverage by a federal
court by striking the offending limitation in state spending cases would require ap-
propriations to be made by a sovereign not dependent for its existence on the fed-
eral authority in a situation where there was no constitutional duty to make any
appropriation. Pending legislative revision, if the state court were to strike the
spending limitations, no one would be subject to sanctions for violating any affirma-
tive regulations that the state legislature did not authorize since only a spending
provision, and not a regulatory one, is involved. Individuals with an admittedly
legitimate legislatively authorized claim would not be denied the relief afforded by
the spending provision which was held invalid for the simple reason that others
were not included. Under this legislative revision view of equal protection, spend-
ing is the one area that the legislature must review at least once every two years.
Whether there ought to be a difference in the scope of review between congres-
sional choices and state choices, or whether there ought to be a difference between
review of spending provisions rather than regulations, the ultimate decision ought
not to turn on an identification of an "actual" purpose. One simply cannot avoid
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presenting challenges to gender-based discrimination, none presented dra-
matic departures from prior (albeit closely divided) cases. But in the next
two terms the idiosyncratic nature of the intermediate test came to the
fore. 18 Perhaps not unexpectedly, these cases presented challenges by
males to gender discrimination, one to the typical statutory rape provision
and one to a females-only state nursing school. By a 5-4 vote without a
majority opinion, the former was upheld in MichaelM. v. Sonoma County Supe-
rior Court. 1 9 But Justice Stewart then left the Court, and the four dissenters
subsequently joined with Justice O'Connor to strike down, by an identical
vote, the females-only nursing school in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan. 120
There was no serious dispute that the appropriate test was intermedi-
ate scrutiny, i.e., whether the means chosen bore a substantial relationship
to an important governmental interest. The briefest of summaries of the
various opinions in the two cases suggests the illusory nature of a test that
purports to be only means related.
There was no disagreement among the justices that the purpose of the
statutory rape law was to prevent teenage pregnancies. For the plurality,
2 1
the statute was sufficiently related to the governmental objective to pass
constitutional muster. They could not say that a gender-neutral statute
would be as effective. In their view, then, the burden implicitly rested with
the party challenging the statute. The principal dissent, 122 relying on Crazg
v. Boren,123 placed the burden on the state to produce evidence that its as-
sertion about the effectiveness of a gender-based statute is true. The plural-
ity also addressed the underlying purposes of equal protection, noting that
males and females are not similarly situated when it comes to getting preg-
118. The case of Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), was not trouble-
some. Without dissent, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that gave the
husband the unilateral right to dispose of community property, although the wife
could take steps to avoid the provisions. The appellant failed to offer any justifica-
tion for the statute and the state did not appeal from the invalidation below. Nor
did Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), provide difficulties with the complica-
tion of an intermediate level of scrutiny, since the majority concluded that only the
lower level of scrutiny was called for. The registration for the draft of males only
had been considered at great length by Congress. Women were not similarly situ-
ated because only males were eligible for combat. The Court also considered and
deferred to the broad power granted Congress with regard to the military, citing
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Schlesinger is discussed at notes 96 & 103
supra.
119. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
120. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
121. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell. 450 U.S. at 466.
122. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall. Id at 481 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
123. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The case is discussed in note 99 supra.
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nant and that the gender-based discrimination was neither invidiously dis-
criminatory nor solely for administrative convenience.124
The nursing school case presented the opposite issue. Here there was
some dispute about the purpose but no question about who bore the burden
of producing empirical evidence on the workings of the gender classifica-
tion.' 2 5 The majority rejected the justification of compensation for past dis-
crimination, because there was no evidence of such practices in nursing.
Rather, it seemed to them to perpetuate the stereotypical view of nursing as
exclusively a woman's job. In any event, the Court concluded that the fe-
males-only rule was not substantially related to the compensatory objective
because men were permitted to attend classes as unregistered auditors in the
degree program. The dissenters viewed the provision as one to expand wo-
men's choices and not one making them the victims of a stereotypical per-
ception of women's roles.
IV. THE END OF THE Two-TIERED APPROACH
As a practical matter, none of the "new" suspect categories is governed
by the two-tiered approach. The alienage cases, which announced a strict
scrutiny test like that used in race cases, actually turn on a characterization
of the governmental interests involved. The state has no legitimate interest
in discriminating against aliens, since the category is of paramount federal
concern. That federal interest does not include determining membership in
the state's political community."' Congressional enactments of nationwide
application are viewed with a relaxed standard.
Illegitimacy, like alienage, is also the product of a valid legal relation-
ship. Absolute disadvantages visited on the child, however, are irrational
and violate substantive due process. The state must provide some proce-
dure whereby the child can arrange for the same legal rights as siblings
124. Justice Blackmun, who was with the majority in Craig, refused to place the
burden on the state in Michael M. He concurred with the plurality because he
believed the statute was sufficiently reasoned. 450 U.S. at 481 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens separately dissented on the ground that the exemption of
the endangered class (females) was utterly irrational. 1d at 496 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
125. 102 S. Ct. at 3336. Justice O'Connor, for the majority, claimed the case did
not involve the "separate but equal" issue of single sex institutions left open in
Vorcheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), affd b
an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), because here there was no all-male
school of nursing elsewhere. That distinction is troublesome. There were other
coed state nursing schools. There is no suggestion the plaintiff would not have been
accepted at any of them nor any hint that they were not at least as good as the all-
female school. The majority opinion relied on the fact that they were not as close.
That all of the other schools were coeducational would seem to be of little constitu-
tional relevance.
126. Cf National League of Cities v. Usery, 456 U.S. 833 (1976).
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similarly situated, i.e., entitlement to the care and support of the natural
parents. The fact that the natural parent might be disadvantaged is the
parent's own doing and not the result of state action.
Gender-based distinctions continue to present problems. Since 1976, it
has been reasonably clear that disabilities designed to limit or channel an
individual's choice of personal development (at least where not compensa-
tory) are per se invalid as irrational. However, the due process clause would
serve equally well as a vehicle here. Equal protection has not functioned as
a pure means analysis.
Some tacit evaluation of the nature of the interest invaded is made
when comparing the fit of the means to the ends, because the comparison
depends in part on an evaluation of the importance of the ends. The nature
of the interest and the importance of the ends call for the Court to make
value-laden judgments. These judgments showed through the statutory
rape case' 2 7 and the women's nursing college case. 128 They dominated Py-
ler v. Doe,'29 the Texas illegal alien case. They are at the bottom of the
dissenting opinions in Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz'3 and Schweiker v.
Wilson,"' which urged a standard of review marginally more demanding
than minimum rationality, albeit less demanding than the intermediate
scrutiny test of substantial relationship to an important governmental inter-
est. Ironically, judgments are necessary in order to avoid the constitutional-
izing of trivial personal interests and the denigrating of important state
interests.
V. THE 1980's: ATTEMPTS AT INTERMEDIATE SCRuTINY
The 1980's promise to be a critical time in equal protection jurispru-
dence. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Court sought to identify
legislative categories that triggered a strict means oriented analysis. The
Court then implicitly recognized that strict scrutiny was insensitive to gov-
ernmental interests and, in 1976, announced the adoption of an intermedi-
ate or middle tier level of review. Since the October 1980 Term, the Court
has attempted to apply such intermediate review. The temper of the lan-
guage in the various opinions suggests that the judgments reflect the jus-
tices' hidden agendas.
The differing positions of the various blocs suggest that an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny as a judicial test imposes no check on policy preferences.
It creates the risk of further fractionalization within the Court-with corre-
spondingly less deliberation in judgment. Unless some manageable equal
protection test is devised, it seems likely that either equal protection will
127. Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
128. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
129. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
130. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
131. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
1983]
29
Seeburger: Seeburger: Muddle of the Middle Tier:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
have to cease being the chosen judicial tool for enforcing social justice or the
Court will have to pay the price of politicization: loss of respect and institu-
tional independence.
This Article now turns to a consideration of the recent equal protection
cases, from the point of view of how the Court arrived at its conclusions
rather than what those conclusions were.
The issue, simply stated, is whether there can ever be a purely means
related analytic standard between the logical extremes of the two tiers, one
that does not depend on the importance of the personal interest or value of
the legislative end, however that end is identified. Means analysis failed in
the alienage area, where cases turned on the legitimacy of the governmental
end and not the fit of the means chosen. It failed in the illegitimacy area
because cases turned on the irrationality of imposing disabilities on the
child without procedures for him to make himself similarly situated with his
legitimate siblings. No analysis of means was necessary.
Gender-based categories will be the testing ground. The imposition of
a gender-based disability is easily disposed of. Like penalizing the illegiti-
mate, it may be viewed as an irrational punishment in violation of due
process. Like penalizing the alien, it may be viewed as unrelated to any
legitimate governmental interest. Both are essentially natural law concepts.
But differential treatment which does not prohibit the full development of
selfhood is more complex. There are bases for differential treatment. Physi-
ological differences might suggest class based accommodations even though
individual members might not need them. Most differential cases present-
ing the Supreme Court with difficulty are those that disadvantage the male.
In 1981132 and 1982,' the Court was confronted with cases that
called for the application of the "substantial relation to important govern-
mental purposes" test. The Court was more deeply divided than ever. At
the same time, members of the Court were attempting to apply similar tests
in other areas." 4 An examination of those cases shows that an intermediate
level of means analysis will not solve the problems that caused the collapse
of the two-tiered system. Thus, the viability of equal protection itself is
called into question.
Craig v. Boren ' itself suggests that some intermediate tier will not
work."3 6 The test, as formulated by Justice Brennan, is actually the strict
132. Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
133. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
134. Heated opinions were generated in attempts to break away from the lower
tier in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981);
United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). The dispute
spilled into an interstate commerce area. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating Iowa's truck length regulations).
135. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
136. As previously discussed, the test was borrowed in Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down flat ban on illegitimate child inheriting from father),
[Vol. 48
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss3/1
EQUAL PROTECTION
scrutiny he wanted to use in Frontiero. 137 He employed the same shifting of
the presumption of constitutionality and held: "Suffice is to say that the
showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us that sex represents a
legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."''
Under this test the use of the legislative category must be shown to be "ac-
curate," and it is unlikely that statistics would ever suffice.139 Crazg in-
volved two important interests: the personal interest of an individual who
wanted to sell near beer to teenage males and the state's interest in safe
highways."4 Justice Brennan assumed that the purpose was highway
safety, although there was no legislative history."' Again, weighing the
importance of the state's interest against the relative dignity of the individ-
ual interest was not considered part of the equal protection mix.
1 42
Justice Brennan's articulation of the test, dissenting in the statutory
rape case, 14 3 again appears to be the wolf of strict scrutiny in some less
but was unnecessary for the resolution of cases like Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978) (upholding procedural restrictions on inheritance by illegitimate children),
where the state is only required to provide the illegitimate with some fair procedure.
137. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice Brennan was joined
by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stewart separately, concurred on the
authority of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating preference for father in
naming administrator).
138. 429 U.S. at 204.
139. In Craig, for example, more than ten times as many males in the age group
were arrested for drunkenness (2% males to. 18% females). This difference was "not
trivial," 429 U.S. at 201, but was "unduly tenuous," id at 202. The statistics were
not tied to 3.2% beer, however.
140. An extreme example of this indifference to life and preference for profit is
found in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981). See text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
141. 429 U.S. at 200. As noted previously, Justice Brennan would be willing to
look to the "actual" purpose.
142. The statute in Craig was an odd one. Justice Stewart, concurring sepa-
rately here as in Frontiero, thought the arrangement irrational. 429 U.S. at 214
(Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, who also concurred in Frontiero,
thought this statute not irrational. Id at 215 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The three-
judge district court had found the statute "substantially" related to the goal. Id at
199. The statute did not make drinking 3.2% beer by 18 to 21 year old males crimi-
nal, only their purchase of it. There is some relationship, but not very much. The
same can be said about Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). While at times
Justice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt reads as if he is suggesting that marriage is a
suspect category and fornication a fundamental right, when it came to the interest
of an unmarried woman in obtaining vaginal foam, the regulation on who could
distribute it and for what purposes was lawfully so easily circumvented that again
one would wonder if in fact the asserted ends were furthered at all.
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threatening costume. 4 ' He asserted that the state has the burden of prov-
ing that gender neutral categories would be less effective. 4 5 The "substan-
tial relation to important interests" test is automatically flunked in this case
unless the state proves that more severe penalties on males than females in
statutory rape cases produces fewer teenage pregnancies than gender neu-
tral penalties, i.e., that punishing males deters females.' 46 To the argument
that punishing the female less severely makes her more likely to report the
crime, Justice Brennan retorted that such a bare assertion is not enough. 147
The grotesqueness of shifting burdens and looking for actual purposes
is best seen in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp. ,148 the Iowa sixty-five foot double trailer case. While not-
ing that the Court is not empowered to second guess the empirical judg-
ment of the legislature, 4 9 he states that the proper test is to balance the
burden on interstate commerce against the actual purpose of the legisla-
ture.1"' He adds, however, that a protectionist motive invalidates the regula-
tion even if there are safety benefits."' Both the degree of this burden on
144. Justices Blackmun and Powell seem to have come full circle. Justice Black-
munjoined in Justice Powell's concurrence in Frontiero but joined with Justice Bren-
nan in Craig. Justice Powell joined the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist in
Michael A while Justice Brennan concurred specially.
145. 450 U.S. at 489 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Here again, as in Craig, Justice Bren-
nan expressed doubts as to what the actual purpose was. He suspected that the
motive for the legislation was the traditional uncritical view that the female lacked
the capacity to consent to the loss of anything so precious as her chastity. Id at 494
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare the irrebuttable presumption line of cases,
which are discussed in note 88 supra.
148. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). A similar Wisconsin regulation was invalidated by a
unanimous Court in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
Iowa, unlike Wisconsin, offered evidence on the unsafe aspects of 65 foot doubles.
There was no opinion of the Court, with Justices White and Blackmun joining with
Justice Stevens on Justice Powell's plurality opinion and only Justice Marshall join-
ing in Justice Brennan's concurrence.
149. 450 U.S. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). Compare the extremely deferen-
tial approach of Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
150. 450 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell has stated that
under the commerce clause, as opposed to the equal protection clause, the Court
can ignore the stated purpose and look to the actual purpose. Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 475-76 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
151. He found a motive in the Iowa Governor's message vetoing legislation rais-
ing the truck limit to 65 feet and from the legislature's failure to override the veto.
Thus, the result in the case is that the older law, passed at a time when there may
have been no 65 foot doubles, by a legislature whose purpose and motives are un-
questioned, is held unconstitutional because inferences about supposed motives of
the governor and a minority of the legislature in refusing to act.
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interstate commerce and the number of lives lost on the highway are thus
irrelevant to this means oriented mode of analysis.
The final example of the use of burden-shifting techniques to avoid
making substantive judgments is seen in Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Plyler v. Doe.152 Texas refused to provide free public education to
illegal aliens. Colorable state interests were posited but rejected as un-
proven. First, there was no evidence of a burden on the economy that
would justify state concern over the economic effect of a sudden influx into
schools caused by illegal aliens. 53 Second, there was no evidence that ex-
cluding these children would improve the quality of education, except in
the way that the exclusion of any child would reduce numbers and thereby
ease the financial burden on the schools.' 54 Finally, there was no evidence
that those children would be less likely to remain in Texas and put their
education to productive social or political use.' 55 Thus, Justice Brennan
again did not have to confront the relative weight of the individual interest
versus that of the state.
This burden-shifting approach to the middle tier translates into scru-
tiny which is "heightened in theory, fatal in fact." It suggests that, because
there would never be adequate statistical proof, no state can resolve
problems through novel legislative categories in areas that trigger interme-
diate scrutiny, even where there is a very strong intuitive feeling that they
would work.
By way of contrast, Justice Rehnquist, who has most frequently writ-
ten in opposition to Justice Brennan, is much more deferential to legislative
judgments and much more hostile to heightened scrutiny. Because of his
concern over the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature where no per-
152. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The Court (Justice Brennan joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens) applied a heightened form of scrutiny where
there was no suspect category or fundamental right. Justice Brennan said simply
that the means chosen must further some substantial goal rather than that they
must substantially further some important goal. Nothing seems to turn on this dif-
ference in phrasing.
153. If such were the concern, Justice Brennan suggests denying the illegal aliens
employment, see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), as a more effective alterna-
tive. This smacks of strict scrutiny.
154. Thus, the burden is to prove a special financial burden, not just an addi-
tional one. This is bottomed on the assumption that the illegal alien parents are
meeting the same tax burden as other parents.
155. At this point Justice Brennan comes very close to breaking away from a
pure means analysis and looking at the relative weight of the individual interest and
the value of the state goal. Implicit throughout the opinion is the notion that illegal
immigration is a national problem almost preempted by Congress's failure to act
and that there was the real possibility that since the federal government might tol-
erate the presence of those illegal aliens almost indefinitely, Texas would wind up
with a subclass of illiterates within its borders completely outweighing temporary
marginal cost savings to the state.
1983]
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sonal liberty interests are involved, he invariably votes to sustain the stat-
utes without significant reference to the relative weight of the governmental
interest or the dignity of the individual claim. This is not to say that he
does not admit to employing some form of heightened scrutiny in gender
discrimination cases,' 5 6 but he seems to engage in the presumption of con-
stitutionality common to the lower tier. He resolved the statutory rape case
in favor of the statute's validity because he could not say that a gender
neutral approach would be as effective. Thus, the classification was "suffi-
ciently related to pass constitutional muster."' 5 7  For Justice Rehnquist,
this deference also seems to follow from his refusal to look for actual legisla-
tive purposes. 5 8 Like Justice Brennan, he has not been tempted to look to
the dignity of the personal interest or the importance of government ends in
order to resolve particular middle-level scrutiny cases. It may be that, like
Justice Brennan's, Justice Rehnquist's heightened scrutiny is actually just
the traditional two-tiered scrutiny-but with an emphasis on the lower, not
the higher, tier.
All of the other justices joined either Justice Brennan 159 or Justice
Rehnquist,' 6° recognizing the appropriateness, at least in some instances, of
an intermediate level of scrutiny. 6 ' Justice O'Connor has, since joining the
Court, written a major sex discrimination opinion subscribing to the "sub-
156. Dissenting in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976), Justice Rehnquist
protested against heightened scrutiny where no personal interests were affected or
where the statute did not work against a group entitled to special judicial protec-
tion. While recognizing that something more than minimal scrutiny was in fact
being employed in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and its progeny, he found that
Craik involved only discrimination against males. Later writing the plurality opin-
ion in Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), he recognized
again that something more than minimal scrutiny has been used, id at 468-69, even
though the legislative category is neither invidious nor used only for administrative
convenience. Id at 476.
157. Michaad M., 450 U.S. at 473.
158. He calls finding legislative motives a "hazardous" business. Id at 469. He
does recognize that the commerce clause cases present a somewhat different situa-
tion "if the asserted safety justification, although rational, is merely a pretext for
discrimination against interstate commerce." Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 692 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But he cautions against
trying to find only one actual purpose.
159. Justice Brennan's opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), was
joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun.
160. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super.
Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Powell.
161. Justice Stewart, who retired at the end of the October 1981 Term, joined
the plurality but also submitted a separate concurring opinion in Michael M. v.
Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring). While
arguing that males and females were not similarly situated in the statutory rape
area, he nonetheless seemed to apply something more than minimal scrutiny in
[Vol. 48
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stantial relationship-important governmental interest" formulation in a
case where the complainant was male.16 2 Each of the other justices has
written separately in the 1980 and 1981 terms in cases involving the at-
tempt to apply a means oriented level somewhere between the two
extremes.
Justice White and Marshall have joined Justice Brennan's burden-
shifting opinions.' 6 3 Justice White has differed from Justices Brennan and
Marshall only in refusing to join them in those cases where the issue was
whether heightened scrutiny was called for.'6 4 Both Justice White and
Marshall dissented separately in the males-only draft registration case, and
both were joined by Justice Brennan. 6 5 For Justice White, the nature of
the governmental interest or the dignity of the individual claim did not
seem relevant. The justification offered-that jobs filled by volunteers must
be filled by a males-only draft-was not "adequate."' 6 6 For Justice Mar-
shall, there as no support for the government's argument.' 6 7 The govern-
ment must show that registering women would "substantially impede" its
efforts, and it cannot meet that burden without showing that a gender neu-
tral statute would be less effective.' 6 Outside of the suspect category and
fundamental rights area, Justice Marshall has urged a sliding scale standard
of equal protection review which does take account of the nature of the
governmental interest and the individual claim.'
69
concluding that the statute is "realistically" related to the "legitimate" state pur-
pose of reducing problems and risks of teenage intercourse and pregnancy.
162. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). The
language of the opinion suggests adherence to the Brennan approach. The state
interest or purpose of compensation was examined and rejected. The burden of
justification was placed on the state, and an individual interest of only trivial value
prevailed. The male wanted to go to this particular school, not because he could
not get the program or quality elsewhere, but because of its location. It would seem
that either he would lose if there were a males-only school on the other side of the
state rather than a coeducational one across the street, or that sexually separate but
equal facilities trigger the same level of scrutiny as regulations that burden one sex.
163. See Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 488 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1975). With Justices Brennan
and Stevens, they formed Justice O'Connor's majority in Mississippi Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
164. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221
(1981); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
165. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (opinions of White and Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting). For the majority, Justice Rehnquist refused to apply height-
ened scrutiny because of the nature of the governmental interest.
166. Id at 85 (White, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 111 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. Id at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The school financing case resolution for him, like the registration case, did
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Justice Stevens's voting has been identical with Justice White's, except
that he stayed with Justices Brennan and Marshall and joined Justice Pow-
ell's dissent in Schweiker v. Wilson."' However, he wrote a separate concur-
ring opinion in Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,17' rejecting anything more
than minimal rationality there. He dissented separately in the statutory
rape case, suggesting that the statute was irrational.17 2
Chief Justice Burger has consistently voted with Justice Rehnquist to
uphold the legislation in any case where intermediate scrutiny was
urged.' 71 He wrote the dissent in the illegal alien education case.' 74 The
judgments made by the majority, in his view, were not appropriate for the
judicial branch, however much he might agree with them.
Justice Brennan could not get the remaining justices, Powell and
Blackmun, to join in his plurality opinions applying strict scrutiny to gen-
der classifications.' 75 He did get them to join in intermediate level cases, 17 6
but they joined the Rehnquist majority in the draft registration case. 177
Justice Blackmun has made it clear that he has given up on formulat-
ing any particular test to measure the fit of the means in sex discrimination
cases.' 78 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, also dissented sepa-
rately in the nursing school case.' 79 He felt the majority was wrong under
any standard of review, even where there was genuine sexual stereotyping.
Justice Powell recognized the relative unimportance of the individual inter-
est-the inconvenient distance of the school-rather than the denial of a
not turn on an evaluation of the relative weight of governmental purpose or indi-
vidual interest. He rejected the states' purported concern with local control of edu-
cation as "an excuse rather than as a justification for understood inequality." San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973).
170. 450 U.S. 221, 239 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 496 (1981) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
173. The Chief Justice dissented separately in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 215
(1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting),joined the plurality in Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty.
Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), and wrote a separate dissent in Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3341 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), in
which he generally agreed with the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Rehnquist.
174. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 679 (1973).
176. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
177. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
178. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3341 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (generally joining Justice Powell's dissent); Michael M. v.
Sonoma Cty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 481 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("suf-
ficiently reasoned").
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substantive educational opportunity. 8 ° As for the state interest, he noted
that the single-sex school was newly created and not an ancient relic of
stereotypical thinking.' 8' He concluded that the means chosen were sub-
stantially related to the end and that allowing men to audit classes was an
insubstantial deviation from the perfect relationship, a policy which few
took advantage of because tuition was charged but no credit was given.'
8 2
Thus, of all the current justices, only Justice Powell (explicitly) and
Justice Blackmun (implicitly) apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.
However, it is not purely means related because it is not insensitive to the
potential importance of the state's interest or the validity of the individual
interest. 183
It is interesting that these two justices, but not Justice White, were able
to join the majority in P1yler v. Doe. 8 a Each also wrote a separate concur-
rence,'8 5 discussing the individual interest in some level of education, the
potential creation of a permanent underclass, and the nature of the state's
interest.
It is even more interesting that one wrote the majority and the other
the dissent in Schweiker v. Wilson."' Both had previously joined Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion denying anything more than minimum scru-
tiny in the railroad pension case.' 8 7 But Justice Powell's dissent, while bot-
tomed on the idea that the category was not irrational, suggested a
somewhat heightened level of scrutiny.'8 8 He recognized that under the
180. Id at 3347 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Id at 3346 (Powell, J., dissenting).
182. Id at 3347 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
183. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1982), which balanced the burden
on interstate commerce against the asserted countervailing safety interest.
184. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Justice Powell was the swing vote, having written the
majority opinion in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
185. 457 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 236 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
186. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
187. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). In
dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, urged a standard of review
that was "not toothless." Id at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Brennan,
this level of review did not involve a shifting of the burden of justification as in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). He did look to the equities of the case, the
congressional interest in reducing expenditures, and the personal interest in earned
(but not vested) benefits. To that extent, his view of a modified lower tier resembles
the middle tier of Justices Powell and Blackmun in sex discrimination cases.
188. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Stevens concurred separately
in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Thus he noted the obvious, that the "any conceivable basis"
standard of minimum rationality means that "judicial review will constitute a mere
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Flemming v. Nestor" 9 view of social security spending, the actual purpose is
irrelevant if any state of facts would support mere rationality. However,
where no purpose of the statute, other than its effect, appears from the legis-
lative history, the lower tier test is whether the means bear a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to the asserted purposes of this statute. This approach,
as articulated, does not state whether the relative importance of saving
money or the personal dignity afforded by the largesse enters into the
calculus.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: DOUBTS ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY
Equal protection seems to have become a preferred mode of analysis in
cases involving challenges to legislative categories. The Court has presented
itself as not preempting the democratic branch, concerning itself only with
the choice of means and thus not precluding legislative action in needful
areas because, unlike due process, the importance of the subject area or the
constitutional protection of the individual interest were not part of the anal-
ysis. ' 9 The initial two-tiered approach failed because nothing in fact ever
survived strict scrutiny. The test was insensitive to the importance, relative
or otherwise, of the governmental interest. The difficulty became obvious
when the Court boilerplated fourteenth amendment equal protection into
the fifth amendment, then had to find another test because of Congress's
manifest authority in the alienage area. Eventually, the Court recognized
that legitimate governmental concerns required something other than strict
scrutiny.'9
1
tautological recognition that Congress did what it intended to do." Schweicker, 450
U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring). He noted that the actual purpose can be
unknown, and that this use of an actual purpose test means that the same statute
could be constitutional in one state but unconstitutional in another. For Justice
Stevens, the statute seemed reasonable, a cut above merely rational.
189. 363 U.S. 603 (1961).
190. This justification for more judicial activism in the equal protection area
probably no longer has the same force. The dimensions of an asserted liberty inter-
est under due process are merely assumed. The analysis is simply whether that as-
serted interest could be less infringed upon were the state to pursue its interest by
some less restrictive means. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), especially the concurring opinion ofJustice Harlan. The various opinions in
the case are summarized briefly in note 9 supra. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
191. The failure to recognize this means that in drawing legislative districts, for
example, interests such as history, economics, group interests, area, geography, de-
sire to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas, access of citizens to
their representatives, theories of bi-cameralism, occupation, attempts to balance ur-
ban, suburban, and rural power, or any other preference of a majority (or all but
one) of the voters, since they cannot be judicially evaluated, cannot be recognized
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For most justices, the application of some intermediate level of review
is no different from the unsuccessful two-tiered approach. Four or five con-
tinue the presumption of unconstitutionality, so that everything fails inter-
mediate scrutiny regardless of the importance of the governmental interest.
Two continue extreme deference to legislative judgments, so that mere ra-
tionality seems to suffice. Of the two who apply some intermediate level of
scrutiny, only one attempts to articulate it in the opinion. All treat equal
protection as involving only an analysis of means. In consequence, the
Court actively and eagerly intervenes to upset legislative choices in order to
vindicate what may be trivial personal interests. This is done at the expense
of legislative action in areas of legitimate and important governmental con-
cern. The Court simply disagrees with the choice of means, a choice which
at one time was thought to be the essence of the legislative power and the
paradigm of the lack of judicial institutional competence.' 9 2
The result of the call for more activity under equal protection than
under due process is to bring the Court into areas where its institutional
justification is actually weaker. The Court acts to extend benefits to classes
of people, which frequently involves the appropriation and expenditures of
additional funds. Due process involves the invocation of judicial relief on
behalf of an individual against government intrusion, a much more judi-
cially manageable form of relief.
Increased judicial activity by an increasingly divided Court, on behalf
of trivial interests, in areas where judicially manageable standards have not
been and probably cannot be developed, can only jeopardize the Court's
position. The Court has been invalidating statutes that most would agree
are unreasonable. It has been doing so by engaging in a presumption of
unconstitutionality that requires a state to meet what has proved to be an
unmeetable burden before it can legislate in critical areas. When it sustains
legislation, it does so by making only conclusory statements that may in fact
make legislative policy preferences. A new direction is imperative.
192. See note 91 supra.
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